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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Pursuant to this Court's Order dated May 24, 2017, and pursuant to Rule
24(a)(5) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the following three questions
are presented for review:
1.
Are the Utah State University Research Foundation and
the Utah State University Advanced Weather Systems Foundation
entitled to immunity under the Governmental Immunity Act of Utah
(Immunity Act or the Act) as a public corporation and/or an
instrumentality of the state?
2.
Utah Code sections 63G-7-501 and -502 vest exclusive,
original jurisdiction over any action brought under the Immunity Act in
the district courts and venue in the county in which the claim arose or
in Salt Lake County. Do these provisions reflect an intent by the State
of Utah to limit the Immunity Act's waiver of sovereign immunity to
suits brought in Utah district courts?
3.
If question 2 is answered in the affirmative, does the
Office of the Attorney General for the State of Utah or any litigant have
authority under Utah law to waive the jurisdictional and venue
provisions enacted ~y the Utah Legislature in the Immunity Act?
A court of the United States has asked this Court for guidance with respect
to those specific questions of Utah law. Accordingly, this Court is "not presented
with a decision to affirm or reverse, and traditional standards of review do not
apply." Robert J. DeBry & Assocs. v. Qwest Dex, Inc., 2006 UT 41, iJ 11, 144 P.3d
1079 (analyzing Utah law question certified by the Tenth Circuit).
This Court has 'jurisdiction under Utah Code section 78-2-2(1) to answers a
~

question of law certified by the" United States District Court for the District of

6
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Utah. Id. On certification, this Court only answer "the legal questions presented
without resolving the underlying dispute." Egbert v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., 2007 UT
64, 17, 167 P.3d 1058 (additional quotations and citations omitted).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION AND STATUTES OF CENTRAL
IMPORTANCE
Pursuant to Rule 24(a)(l 1) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure,
because the provisions at issue are not lengthy, no addendum setting out the
provisions at issue is necessary. See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(l 1). The constitutional
provision and statutes of central importance are set out verbatim below. See Utah
R. App. P. 24(a)(6).

U.S. CONST. amend. XI
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to
any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.

UTAH CODE ANN.§ 63G-7-102(4)
"Governmental entity" means the state and its political subdivisions as both
are defined in this section.

UTAHCODEANN. § 63G-7-102(8)
"Political subdivision" means any county, city, town, school district,
community reinvestment agency, special improvement or taxing district, local
district, special service district, any entity created by an interlocal agreement
7
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~

adopted under Title 11, Chapter 13, Interlocal Cooperation Act, or other
~

governmental subdivision or public corporation.
UTAH CODE ANN.§ 63G-7-102(10)

"State" means the state of Utah, and includes each office, department,
division, agency, authority, commission, board, institution, hospital, college,
university, Children's Justice Center, or other instrumentality of the state.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 63G-7-501(1)

The district courts have exclusive, original jurisdiction over any action
brought under this chapter.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 63G-7-502(1)

Actions against the state may be brought in the county in which the claim
arose or in Salt Lake County.
STATEMENT OF CASE
Nature of Case and Course of Proceedings in Trial Court

This case concerns GeoMetWatch's allegations that the defendants have
breached multiple of their obligations to GeoMetWatch, including by
misappropriating GeoMetWatch's trade secrets and materially breaching their
contracts with GeoMetWatch. (R13). In May of 2014, GeoMetWatch brought
claims against the defendants in the United States District Court for the District of
vii

Utah (the "Federal Case"), based on diversity jurisdiction.

8
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After years of litigation, and near the end of fact discovery, in December of
2016, USURF 1 and AWSF 2 filed motions for partial summary judgment, arguing
they were governmental entities subject to sovereign immunity. USURF and
AWSF argued that, because GeoMetWatch had not complied with the notice
provisions of the Immunity Act, most of the claims against USURF and AWSF
should be dismissed. (R242-419). At the completion of briefing on those motions,
the federal district court sought certification of the three questions now before this
Court. (R518).

Statement of Facts Relevant to Issues Presented for Review
GeoMetWatch is a weather satellite technology company that was founded
and controlled by former members of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (''NOAA") and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(''NASA"). (R573-75).
USURF is a commercial enterprise owned by Utah State University
("USU") that boasts revenues through June of 2015 exceeding $7 4 million.
(R663). USURF has been responsible for the design, fabrication, and operation of
sensors on over 430 spaces missions. (R194). USURF's employees are not

1

The term "USURF ," as used in this brief, means Defendant Utah State
University Research Foundation.
2

The term "AWSF," as used in this brief, means Defendant Utah State
University Advanced Weather Systems Foundation.

9
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employees of the state of Utah; they are employees ofUSURP. (R646:19). AWSF
1:/J

is also owned by USU and was developed for the business enterprise that
GeoMetWatch had created. (R577).
Article II, Section 6(d) ofUSURP's bylaws states that "[t]he property,
affairs, and business of [USURP] shall be subject to oversight by [USURP's]
Board." (R275). USURP's bylaws further provide that its "Board provides
oversight and direction for [USURP]' s policies, procedures and resource
allocations .... " (R275). USURP's articles of incorporation state that one of
USURP's purposes is to "[c]onduct research in areas deemed appropriate by the
governing Board of Trustees of the [USURP] .... " (R268). USURP prominently
states on its website that it is "governed by an independent Board of Trustees."
(R657). USURP's officers (who are not state employees) direct the "day-to-day
business affairs" of USURP. (R278).
AWSF's bylaws state that "[t]he business and affairs of [AWSF] shall be
managed by its Board of Directors ...." (R360). AWSF's articles of
incorporation state that A WSF is managed by, and reports to, its own independent
Board of Directors. (R354 (stating that AWSF's purpose is "[t]o pursue ...
activities as may be determined by the Board of Directors consistent with the
requirements of IRC §§ 501(c)(3) and 509(a)(3)")).

10
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Defendants USURP and A WSF were engaged in a joint enterprise with
GeoMetWatch to develop an advanced, next-generation satellite-based weather
sensing system. (R568). USURF and AWSF were responsible for the construction
of the sensor, while GeoMetWatch was responsible for the commercialization of
the sensor's data. (R576-77). As part of that enterprise, GeoMetWatch entered
into agreements with USURP and AWSF, which agreements contained nondisclosure and confidentiality provisions, as well as exclusivity obligations.
(R568).
In the fall of 2013, USURP and AWSF introduced GeoMetWatch to Alan
Hall, an individual whom they represented to GeoMetWatch was a person
interested in investing in the enterprise. (R569). As GeoMetWatch later
discovered, however, USURF and AWSF were working with Hall to
misappropriate GeoMetWatch's trade secrets and to deprive GeoMetWatch of the
business opportunity that it had created. (R592).
Prior to GeoMetWatch filing its complaint in May of 2014, AWSF, along
with other defendants, filed a declaratory judgment action against GeoMetWatch in
the First District Court of the State of Utah, Case No. 140100173 (the "State
Case").
GeoMetWatch removed the State Case to federal court and then successfully
moved for consolidation of the State Case and Federal Case, which consolidation

11
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occurred on April 3, 2015. (R306). Although AWSF objected to removal and
~

consolidation, it did not object on governmental immunity grounds. Rather, it
simply joined the other defendants' objection to removal, which objection was

1~

based on alleged technical deficiencies. (R306).
When AWSF answered GeoMetWatch's complaint in July of 2014, it did
not allege a defense of sovereign immunity under the Act or otherwise. (R303).
GeoMetWatch amended its complaint in December of 2014 to include
claims against USURF. (R305). AWSF served its answer to GeoMetWatch's
amended complaint on January 16, 2015 and, again, did not assert a defense of
sovereign immunity. (R305). While USURF included sovereign immunity as an
affirmative defense in answering GeoMetWatch's amended complaint, it never
raised that issue with the federal court or counsel until years later-after the parties
had spent years and hundreds of thousands of dollars litigating the substantive
validity of the claims against USURF and A WSF, as reflected in the docket for the
Federal Case. (Rl-69).
USURF and AWSF filed counterclaims against GeoMetWatch and a thirdparty complaint related to GeoMetWatch's claims in the Federal Case. (R108204).

It was not until December of 2016, when USURF and A WSF filed motions
for summary judgment, that USURF and A WSF argued they were governmental
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entities subject to sovereign immunity and that, because GeoMetWatch had not
complied with the notice provisions of the Immunity Act, most of the claims
against USURF and A WSF should be dismissed. (R242-419). The three certified
questions relate to those arguments under the Act.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Question No. 1: Are the Utah State University Research Foundation

and the Utah State University Advanced Weather Systems Foundation
entitled to immunity under the Governmental Immunity Act of Utah
(Immunity Act or the Act) as a public corporation and/or an instrumentality
of the state?
No. While the Immunity Act does not define the terms "public corporation"
or "instrumentality of the state," and while there appears to be no Utah case law
interpreting those terms for purposes of the Act, numerous courts across the
country addressing the issue of what constitutes a governmental entity for purposes
of their own, similar immunity acts or the Eleventh Amendment to the United
States Constitution have developed essentially the same key factors to aid in
making this determination. This Court should adopt and apply those same factors
to the undisputed record to answer Question No. 1.
Applying those factors, neither USURF nor A WSF are public corporations
or instrumentalities of the state under the Immunity Act (or otherwise). Neither

13
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USURF nor AWSF are subject to legislative or executive oversight. And, neither
v,

entity relies upon state funds. Both USURF and A WSF were created to have an
active role in the marketplace. Money flows from USURF and A WSF to Utah

~

State University ("USU"), and not the other way around. Additionally, neither
entity employs or is controlled by state employees neither entity performs integral
state functions, and a judgment against either entity would not be a judgment
against the state. Accordingly, neither entity is "a governmental entity" for
purposes of the Immunity Act.
Question No. 2: Utah Code sections 63G-7-501 and -502 vest

exclusive, original jurisdiction over any action brought under the Immunity
Act in the district courts and venue in the county in which the claim arose or
in Salt Lake County. Do these provisions reflect an intent by the State of
Utah to limit the Immunity Act's waiver ofsovereign immunity to suits
brought in Utah district courts?
No. The State of Utah did not intend that the Act limit waiver of sovereign
to suits brought in Utah state courts. But, this question is not relevant to USURF
and A WSF's waiver of sovereign immunity in the Federal Case because the
sovereign immunity that was waived allowing USURF and A WSF to be sued in
federal court relates to the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution,
not the Immunity Act.

14
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The Immunity Act is but one expression of the principle of state sovereign
immunity. The State of Utah did not intend the Immunity Act and its waiver
provisions to encapsulate all principles associated with the doctrine of sovereign
immunity. The Immunity Act codifies state common law concerning state
sovereign immunity, which immunizes state entities from being sued in their own
state courts. The Immunity Act waives that state sovereign immunity to permit
suits in Utah state courts against Utah governmental entities on claims expressly
waived under the Act.
The Act does not and cannot govern the sovereign immunity granted to
states from suits in federal court under the Eleventh Amendment. That immunity
and the waiver of that immunity is governed by federal law and, specifically,
federal court decisions interpreting and applying the Eleventh Amendment.
Question No. 3: If question 2 is answered in the affirmative, does the Office
ofthe Attorney General for the State of Utah or any litigant have authority under
Utah law to waive the jurisdictional and venue provisions enacted by the Utah
Legislature in the Immunity Act?
While GeoMetWatch did not answer Question No. 2 in the affirmative, the
answer to this question is "yes." A governmental entity can waive its sovereign
immunity, including the jurisdictional and venue provisions under the Act. Utah

15
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case law makes clear that the Immunity Act is an affirmative defense that can be
waived, including by conduct.
In any event and assuming that USURF and AWSF are governmental
entities, the answer to this question is not relevant to USURF 's and A WSF 's
waivers of sovereign immunity in the Federal Case. As stated in the answer to
Question No. 2 above, whether USURF and AWSF (if they are detennined to be
governmental entities) have waived their immunity from suit in federal court is
governed by the Eleventh Amendment, not the Act. Utah case law makes clear
that the Immunity Act addresses a governmental entity's sovereign immunity from
being sued in its own state courts. Thus, the relevant question is not whether the
jurisdictional and venue provisions of the Act can be waived, it is whether USURF
and A WSF are immune from suit in federal court under the Eleventh Amendment
or whether they have waived that immunity as a matter of federal law.
Federal courts have held that a governmental entity may waive its sovereign
immunity under the Eleventh Amendment in a number of ways, including by
voluntarily invoking jurisdiction of federal courts or by its litigation conduct.
Here, to the extent USURF and A WSF enjoy sovereign immunity because
they are governmental entities, the jurisdictional and venue provisions of the Act
have no impact on whether USURP and A WSF can be sued by GeoMetWatch in
federal court. The case was brought in federal court, not state court, and

16
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consequently their immunity from suit in federal court is governed by the Eleventh
Amendment, not the Act.
Under the applicable federal law, USURF and AWSF waived their Eleventh
Amendment immunity from suit in federal court, including by voluntarily invoking
the federal court's jurisdiction through counterclaims and third-party claims, as
well as by their active participation in the Federal Case for over two years,
consuming hundreds of thousands of dollars in discovery and motion practice
directed to the substantive validity of GeoMetWatch's claims against USURF and
AWSF.

ARGUMENT

I.

USURF AND AWSF ARE NOT ENTITLED TO SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITY UNDER THE ACT
A.

The Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity and Waiver of
Immunity

The doctrine of sovereign immunity is a long-standing principle "rooted in
the medieval British notion that the King could do no wrong" and protects
sovereigns from being sued in their own courts without their consent. Trujillo v.

Utah Dep't ofTransp., 1999 UT App 227,113,986 P.2d 752; see also Nevada v.
Hall, 440 U.S. 410,414 (1979) ("The immunity of a truly independent sovereign
from suit in its own courts has been enjoyed as a matter of absolute right for
centuries."); Madsen v. Borthick, 658 P.2d 627, 629 (Utah 1983) ("Sovereign
immunity-the principle that the state cannot be sued in its own courts without its
17
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consent-was a well-settled principle of American common law at the time Utah
became a state.").
Though initially based on the idea that the King (i.e., the state) could do no
\@

wrong, the doctrine of state sovereign immunity now exists primarily to protect the
states' treasuries. See Federal Maritime Comm 'n v. South Carolina State Ports
Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 765 (2002) (stating that "state sovereign immunity serves the

important function of shielding state treasuries and thus preserving the States'
ability to govern in accordance with the will of their citizens" (additional
Iii

quotations and citation omitted)).
Most jurisdictions have codified some principle of the doctrine of sovereign
immunity in their constitutions or in their statutes. For example, the Eleventh
Amendment to the United States Constitution is one such manifestation of the
doctrine. See U.S. Co~ST. amend. XI ("The Judicial power of the United State~
shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by
Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.").
In 1966, Utah codified some portions of the doctrine of sovereign immunity
with the Immunity Act. See Madsen, 658 P.2d at 629 (stating that the Act, ''which
became effective in 1966, reaffirmed governmental immunity 'for any injury
which results from the exercise of a governmental function"').
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In many codifications of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, including in
the Immunity Act, the sovereign has waived its sovereign immunity for certain
types of claims. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 63G-7-301 (listing waivers of immunity
for suits in state courts, including for contractual obligations); see also COLO. REV.
STAT.§ 24-10-106 (listing waivers of immunity for suits in state court, including
for dangerous conditions of public buildings); 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(l) (waiving
immunity for the federal government to be sued in federal court for most torts
committed by persons acting on behalf of the federal government).
Sovereigns consent to those waivers for a number of reasons, including to
induce private corporations to enter into contractual agreements with states without
fear there could be no recovery in the event of a breach, as well as concern for
fairness and equity for injured plaintiffs. See, e.g., CSX Transp., Inc. v. City of
Garden City, 325 F.3d 1236, 1244 (11th Cir. 2003) (describing the rationales for
various kinds of waivers of immunity); see also David W. Fuller, Intentional Torts
and Other Exceptions to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 8 U. St. Thomas L.J. 375,
377 (2011) (noting that "a concern for fairness and equity in favor of aggrieved
plaintiffs" was one reason for the passage of legislation allowing some tort claims
against the federal government in federal court).
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B.

Determination of Governmental Entities Entitled to
Sovereign Immunity Under the Act

The Immunity Act defines a "governmental entity" as "the state and its
political subdivisions." UTAH CODE ANN. § 63G-7-102(3). The "state" is defined
to include a ''hospital, college, university ... or other instrumentality of the state."

Id. -102(9). "Political subdivision" is defined to include "a public corporation."
\@

Id. -102(7). The Act does not define "instrumentality of the state" or "public
corporation." And, there does not appear to be any Utah case law giving guidance
on how to determine whether an entity is an "instrumentality of the state" or a
"public corporation" under the Act.
That said, many jurisdictions across the country have addressed this question
in the context of their own, similar immunity acts, constitutions, or common laws
and have formulated similar factors to aid in the analysis. 3 Those same factors are

3

See, e.g., Johnson v. Reddoch, 198 So.3d 497, 505 (Ala. 2015) (identifying
non-exhaustive factors to include ''whether a result favorable to the plaintiff would
directly affect a contract or property right of the State, ... whether the defendant is
simply a conduit through which the plaintiff seeks recovery of damages from the
State, ... and whether a judgment against the officer would directly affect the
financial status of the State treasury"); Hartman v. Regents of Univ. of Colo., 22
P .3d 524, 527 (Colo. Ct. App. 2000) (examining (1) how the entity was
characterized by state law, (2) the level of autonomy and independence the entity
enjoyed from the control of the state, (3) and whether any judgment against the
entity would ultimately be paid by the state); Town ofRocky Hill v. SecureCare
Realty, LLC, 105 A.3d 857 (Conn. 2015) (examining whether (1) the state created
the entity and expressed an intention in the enabling legislation that the entity be
treated as a state agency; (2) the entity was created for a public purpose or to carry
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out a function integral to state government; (3) the entity is financially dependent
on the state; (4) the entity's officers, directors or trustees are state functionaries; (5)
the entity is operated by state employees; (6) the state has the right to control the
entity; (7) the entity's budget, expenditures and appropriations are closely
monitored by the state; and (8) a judgment against the entity would have the same
effect as a judgment against the state); Plancher v. UCF Athletics Ass 'n, Inc., 175
So. 3d 724, 726-27 (Fla. 2015) ("[T]he key factor in determining whether a private
corporation is an instrumentality of the state for sovereign immunity purposes is
the level of governmental control over the performance and day-to-day operations
of the corporation." (additional quotations and citation omitted)); Veolia Water
Indianapolis, LLC v. Nat'/ Tr. Ins. Co., 3 N.E.3d 1, 10 n.10 (Ind. 2014), on reh 'g,
12 N.E.3d 240 (Ind. 2014) (considering (1) whether the state statutes and case law
view the agency as an arm of the state, (2) the source of the entity's funding, (3)
the entity's degree of local autonomy, (4) whether the entity is concerned primarily
with local as opposed to statewide, problems, (5) whether the entity has the
authority to sue and be sued in its own name, and (6) whether the entity has the
right to hold and use property); Pauly v. Chang, 498 S.W.3d 394, 402 (Ky. Ct.
App. 2015) (examining whether entity operated under direction and control of state
and was funded by state treasury); Davio v. Nebraska Dep 't ofHealth & Human
Servs., 786 N.W.2d 655, 663-64 (Neb. 2010) (noting that if a judgment against a
private party ''would be paid from public funds," the action was in essence, an
action against the state); Royster v. New Jersey State Police, 110 A.3d 934, 943
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2015) ("[C]ourts should consider: (1) whether the
money that would pay any judgment against the entity would come from the State;
(2) the status of the entity under state law, including its treatment under the law
and whether the entity is separately incorporated, whether the entity can sue or be
sued in its own right, or is immune from state taxation; and (3) the entities degree
of autonomy from the State."); Memorial Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Tatsch Constr., Inc., 12
P .3d 431, 441 (N.M. 2000) (concluding that "the standard to be applied is whether
under the totality of the circumstances the government entity is so intertwined with
the private entity that the private entity has become an alter ego of the public
entity."); Abbott v. North Carolina Bd. ofNursing, 627 S.E.2d 482,484 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2006) (holding that state board of nursing was state agency entitled to
sovereign immunity where the board was created by the General Assembly, the
Governor and General Assembly appoint the board's members, and the board
performed a public purpose); Clarke v. Oregon Health Sci. Univ., 175 P.3d 418,
427 (Or. 2007) ("An instrumentality of the state performs a function traditionally
performed by the state. Additionally, the state generally outlines the powers and
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used by federal courts in analyzing whether an entity is entitled to state sovereign
immunity under the Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution. See,

e.g., Woods v. Rondout Valley Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. ofEduc., 466 F.3d 232, 240 (2d

duties of its instrumentalities, either via statutory enactment or some other method.
An instrumentality of the state is subject, at least in part, to the control of the state
in some way."); Snead v. Society for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals ofPa., 929
A.2d 1169 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007) ( stating that "the important factors to be
considered are whether the entity was created by the state to perform a state
function so that a judgment against it would, in essence, injure the state"); Rhode
Island Turnpike & Bridge Auth. v. Nugent, 182 A.2d 427, 432 (R.I. 1962) (holding
that bridge authority was state instrumentality with sovereign immunity where it
was a tax free, self-supporting, non-profit organization with unpaid officers,
reporting to state and collecting tolls only to keep bridge in repair and to pay cost
before specified time when bridge should pass to state); Health Promotion
Specialists, LLCv. South Carolina Bd. ofDentistry, 743 S.E.2d 808,814 (S.C.
2013) (considering whether the entity performs the work of the state, whether the
entity was created by the legislature, and whether the entity is subject to local
control); University Interscholastic League v. Southwest Officials Ass 'n, Inc., 319
S.W.3d 952, 958 {Tex. Ct. App. 2010) (finding that entity was a "governmental
unit" where it was "required by statute to implement state . . . policies, granted
rulemaking and enforcement power over such policies, subjected to extensive
oversight from the legislative and executive branches, and statutorily classified as a
component part of a governmental unit that was created by the Texas
constitution"); Jacobs v. State Teachers' Ret. Sys. of Vt., 816 A.2d 517, 522-24
(Vt. 2002) ("The first factor is whether a judgment against the entity will be paid
for by the state .... The second factor commonly considered is how much
autonomy the entity enjoys in carrying out its functions."); Arnold Agency v. West
Virginia Lottery Comm 'n, 526 S.E.2d 814, 823 (W. Va. 1999) (noting that the five
factors to consider are: (1) whether the body functions statewide; (2) whether it
does the state's work; (3) whether it was created by an act of the legislature; (4)
whether it is subject to local control; and (5) its financial dependence on state
coffers); Lister v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys., 240 N. W.2d 610, 617
(Wis. 1976) (holding that the test is whether the relief sought would require
payment from state funds).
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Cir. 2006) (reiterating "a test that requires us initially to consider six pertinent
factors: (1) how the entity is referred to in the documents that created it; (2) how
the governing members of the entity are appointed; (3) how the entity is funded;
(4) whether the entity's function is traditionally one of local or state government;
(5) whether the state has a veto power over the entity's actions; and (6) whether the
entity's obligations are binding upon the state" (additional quotations and citation
omitted)); United States ex rel. Fields v. Bi-State Dev. Agency ofMissouri-lllinois

Metro. Dist., No. 16-3783, 2017 WL 3254401, at *2 (8th Cir. Aug. 1, 2017)
(applying six-factor test).
There is no dispute here that courts use these factors, and not some other
method, to determine whether an entity is a governmental entity for sovereign
immunity purposes when the terms are not defined. Courts have developed and
used these factors because they go to the very essence of a state's characteristics
entitling it to the powerful cloak of sovereign immunity. See, e.g., Hamilton Mfg.

Co. v. Trustees ofState Coils. in Colo., 356 F.2d 599, 601 (10th Cir.
1966)(explaining that the factors are developed to determine whether the suit is
really a suit against the state); States Marine Lines, Inc. v. Shultz, 498 F .2d 1146,
1150 (4th Cir. 1974). Indeed, it is axiomatic that, to avail one's self of sovereign
immunity, one must be a sovereign or tantamount to a sovereign.

23
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

A comprehensive review of case law across the country reveals the
fallowing six factors encompass those factors courts routinely use to determine
whether an entity is a governmental entity for purposes of sovereign immunity: ( 1)
whether the entity is subject to legislative or executive control; (2) whether the
entity is financially dependent upon the state; (3) whether the entity is staffed by
state employees; (4) whether the entity was created by the state; (5) whether the
entity serves integral state functions; and (6) whether a judgment against the entity
would have the same effect as a judgment against the state.
This Court should adopt and use these factors for its analysis because they
are the best method to determine whether an actor should be granted sovereignty
status entitling it to state sovereign immunity.

C.

v,

The Factors Show that USURF and AWSF Are Not
Governmental Entities Entitled to State Sovereign
Immunity Under the Act

As the parties claiming sovereign immunity, it is USURF and AWSF's
burden to prove that they are entitled to such immunity. See, e.g., Hart v. Salt
Lake City. Comm 'n, 945 P.2d 125, 133 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (stating that "the

supreme court has specifically stated that the defendant has the burden of proving
that it is shielded from liability by governmental immunity"); Woods, 466 F.3d at
251 (stating that "the defendant Board of Education bore the burden of
~

demonstrating that it was an arm of the state entitled to dismissal of this action on
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the ground of Eleventh Amendment immunity"). Applying the six factors set forth
above, neither USURF nor AWSF can satisfy their burden to show that it is a
"public corporation" or "instrumentality of the state" entitled to state governmental
immunity under the Immunity Act. 4
1.

Neither USURF nor AWSF Are Subject to Legislative or
Executive Oversight.

Whether the entity in question is subject to legislative or executive oversight
is a key factor courts use to determine whether an entity is a governmental entity
for sovereign immunity purposes. For example, when examining immunity under
Florida's sovereign immunity statute, the "key factor ... is the level of
govern.mental control over the performance and day-to-day operations of the
corporation." UCF Athletics Ass 'n Inc. v. Plancher, 121 So.3d 1097, 1106 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2013), abrogated on other grounds by Plancher v. UCF Athletics
Ass 'n, Inc., 175 So.3d 724 (Fla. 2015).
Similarly, in New Mexico and Texas, an important consideration is whether
the corporate entity is "subject to legislative oversight." Isler v. New Mexico
Activities Ass 'n, 893 F. Supp. 2d 1145, 1154 (D.N.M. 2012) (finding that

4

This Court has asked whether USURF and A WSF are govern.mental
entities entitled to sovereign immunity under the Immunity Act. In making that
determination, the Court should use the factors outlined in this brief. However, the
same factors are also used to determine whether USURF and AWSF may invoke
sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amended to bar suit in the Federal Case.
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organization regulating interscholastic sports was entitled to immunity under New
~

Mexico's Tort Claims Act, in part, because it was "subject to legislative oversight
in ways that are inconsistent with private entity status"); see also University

~

Interscholastic League, 319 S.W.3d at 958 (finding that entity was "governmental

unit" under Texas Tort Claims Act, where the entity was "subjected to extensive
oversight from the legislative and executive branches").
To enjoy immunity, the entity in question "must be subject to something
more than the sort of control that is exercised by the government in its regulatory
capacity." UCF Athletics, 121 So.3d at 1106. "[T]he mere fact that a corporation
is created by the government will not necessarily establish that it is a governmental
agency or instrumentality." Id.
Neither USURF nor AWSF is subject to legislative or executive oversight,
as reflected in their bylaws and articles of incorporation. Article II, Section 6(d) of
USURF's bylaws states that "[t]he property, affairs, and business of [USURF]
shall be subject to oversight by [USURF's] Board." (R275 (emphasis added)).

USURF's bylaws further provide that its "Board provides oversight and direction
for [USURF]'s policies, procedures and resource allocations .... " (R275).
USURF's articles of incorporation are similar, stating that one ofUSURF's
purposes is to "[ c]onduct research in areas deemed appropriate by the governing
Board of Trustees of the [USURFJ ... ." (R268 (emphasis added)). USURF
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prominently states on its website that it is "governed by an independent Board of
Trustees." (R657). USURF's officers (who are not state employees) direct the
"day-to-day business affairs" ofUSURF. (R278).
With respect to AWSF, its bylaws state that "[t]he business and affairs of
[AWSF] shall be managed by its Board of Directors ...." (R360). AWSF's
articles of incorporation state that A WSF is managed by, and reports to, its own
independent Board of Directors. (R354) (Stating that A WSF's purpose is "[t]o
pursue ... activities as may be determined by the Board ofDirectors consistent
with the requirements ofIRC §§ 501(c)(3) and 509(a)(3)" (emphasis added)).
Simply put, neither Utah's legislature nor its executive branch exercise
control or oversight over USURF's or AWSF's day-to-day operations,
management, business activities, purposes, or policies. This factor therefore
weighs in favor of a finding that neither of these organizations is a "governmental
entity" under the Immunity Act.
2.

Neither USURP nor A WSF Are Financially Dependent
on the State of Utah

Another factor courts consider is whether the corporate entity is financially
dependent on the state in determining whether the entity is a state governmental
entity. See, e.g., Rocky Hill, 105 A.3d at 867. Courts have applied this factor by
examining the flow of money, i.e., whether money flows from the state to the
entity. For example, in U.S. ex rel. Sikk~nga v. Regence BlueCross BlueShield of
27
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Utah, 472 F.3d 702 (10th Cir. 2006), the Tenth Circuit found that Associated
~

Regional and University Pathologists ("ARUP") was not a state entity entitled to
Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity, including because ''the bulk of ARUP's

~

revenues flow from ARUP's commercial operations to the University, rather than
from the University to ARUP." 472 F.3d at 720 (emphasis added).
USURP and A WSF are financially independent from the State of Utah and
USU. USURP has publicly reported revenues through June of 2015 exceeding $74
million. (R663). "[USURP]'s revenues flow from [USURP]'s commercial
operations to the University, rather than from the University to [USURP]."

Sikkenga, 412 F .3d at 720. Additionally, A WSF was set up solely to build
GeoMetWatch's weather sensor for approximately $125 million, which money was
to come from a private loan, not from USU, and certainly not from the State of
'-'

Utah. (R720).
Courts also look at an entity's role in the marketplace as part of the factor of
financial independence. Id. at 719. In Sikkenga, the Tenth Circuit stated that the
university-owned laboratory was not a governmental entity, including because of
its "nationwide activity as a commercial laboratory" and its ability to "enter into
contracts with commercial entities." Id. at 719-20.
USURP's and AWSF's roles in the marketplace also show that neither of
them is financially dependent upon the state. Both USURF and AWSF have
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entered into substantial economic contracts with private commercial entities,
including GeoMetWatch and Defendant Tempus Global Data. USURF has, on at
least one occasion, owned stock in a private company (i.e., GeoMetWatch).
(R660). As of June 30, 2015, in addition to its revenue produced from federal
contracts, USURF was also "performing work for a venture-funded, commercial
satellite imaging company." (R664). USURF's and AWSF's commercial
enterprises are a significant factor weighing against their being deemed
governmental entities.
3.

Neither USURF nor AWSF Are Staffed by State
Employees

Whether an entity is staffed by state employees is another factor courts apply
in determining if the entity is entitled to state sovereign immunity. See Rocky Hill,
105 A.3d at 867. Here, neither USURF nor A WSF have state employees on their
staff. Indeed, Curtis Roberts, a defendant in this case and an employee of USURF,
testified in his deposition that his "paycheck came from USURF ," not from the
State of Utah, and not from USU. (R646: 19).
Accordingly, this factor too weights in favor of finding no governmental
immunity for USURF and AWSF.
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4.

Neither USURF nor A WSF Were Created by the State of
Utah

Whether an entity was created by statute or by the state is a factor courts use
to determine whether the entity is a governmental entity for sovereign immunity
purposes. See, e.g., In re Dodson, 259 B.R. 635,638 (Banlcr. ·E.D. Tenn. 2001)
(noting that corporation created by statute was an "arm or agency" of the State of
@

Tennessee). Neither USURF nor AWSF was created by statute. While USU set
up and owns USURF and AWSF, the fact that a corporation is owned by a public
university does not provide that corporation with governmental immunity. In

Sikkenga, the defendant, ARUP, was wholly owned by the University of Utah, but
the Tenth Circuit held that ARUP was not entitled to governmental immunity. See

id., 472 F.3d at 720.
The Texas Court of Appeals reached a similar conclusion in Lenoir v. U. T.

Physicians, 491 S.W.3d 68 (Tex. Ct. App. 2016). In Lenoir, even though the
defendant was a wholly-owned subsidiary of a university health science center, the
(@

court held that it was not entitled to governmental immunity under the Texas
governmental immunity statute, in part, because "'there is a presumption that a
corporation, even when it is a wholly owned subsidiary of another, is a separate
entity."' Id. at 88 (alteration omitted) (quoting Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Metro

Commc'ns, Inc., 945 F.2d 635,643 (3d Cir. 1991)).
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Here, there is more than a presumption that USURF and A WSF are separate
entities from the State of Utah and USU-there are legal documents, there is
correspondence, and there is testimony reflecting that USURF and AWSF are
separate and distinct entities from the State of Utah and USU. For example,
Robert Behunin, a defendant in this action and a member of A WSF's board of
directors, stated in an email to GeoMetWatch concerning the creation of AWSF,
that "USU, AWS[F] [and] the State of Utah are three distinct entities," and that
this distinction provided "USU and the State of Utah with protection from 'risk."'
(R69 5 (emphasis added)).
Thus, this factor weighs against a finding that USURF or A WSF is a
governmental entity.

5.

Neither USURF nor A WSF Serve Integral State
Functions

In Coppage Construction Co., Inc. v. Sanitation District No. 1, 459 S.W.3d
855 (Ky. 2015), the Supreme Court of Kentucky considered whether a sanitation
district was a governmental entity entitled to sovereign immunity. The court
looked primarily to whether the sanitation district served an "integral state
function." Id. at 862 ("The question of whether an entity carries out an integral
state function has remained the primary focus of our sovereign immunity analysis
since at least the turn of the twentieth century."). In finding that the sanitation
district did not serve an integral state function, the court reasoned:
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While the services provided by [the sanitation district] are no doubt
critically important within the counties it serves, [the sanitation district]
simply does not perform an integral state function. Sewage disposal
and storm water management systems are not a traditional and
necessary state function such as those functions performed by the state
police, our public schools, the corrections system, and public highways
and airways.
Id. at 864 (emphases added).

If the functions of a sanitation district are not integral state functions, the
purely commercial, profit-driven functions of USURF and AWSF certainly are not.
While USURF and AWSF may serve important purposes within the state,
including by providing employment and research opportunities for the citizenry
and USU, those purposes are not "critically important to a state function," such as
"functions performed by the state police, our public schools, the corrections
system, and public highways and airways." Id.
Accordingly, this factor also demonstrates that neither USURF nor AWSF
are governmental entities under the Immunity Act.

6.

A Judgment Against USURF or AWSF Would Not Be a
Judgment Against the State

Because one of the purposes of sovereign immunity is to protect the states'
~

coffers, most courts that have analyzed whether an entity is a part of the state ask
whether a judgment against the entity would impact the state's treasury. See
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 101 n.11 (1984) ("The

general rule is that a suit is against the sovereign if the judgment sought would
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expend itself on the public treasury . . .. " (additional quotations and citation
omitted)).

In this case, a judgment against USURF or AWSF would not impact the
treasury of the State of Utah. If GeoMetWatch obtains a judgment against USURF
or A WSF, GeoMetWatch would execute on their assets, which assets include
USURF's $74 million in annual revenue, the intellectual property owned by
USURF and AWSF, and the contract rights owned by USURF and AWSF.
GeoMetWatch would not look to the State of Utah to satisfy a judgment against
USURF or AWSF.
Thus, all six of the routinely employed factors unanimously weigh in favor
of finding that neither USURF nor AWSF are governmental entities under the
Immunity Act. In such circumstances, "that answer controls" the sovereign
immunity inquiry. Woods, 466 F.3d at 243 (affirming district c~urt's denial of
defendant's motion for dismissal on the ground of Eleventh Amendment
immunity).

D.

USURF's and AWSF's Status as Non-Profit Corporations
Does Not Make Them Governmental Entities

Both USURF and AWSF argued in their summary judgment motions that
their status as non-profit corporations under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal
Revenue Code makes them governmental entities entitled to the procedural
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protections of the Act. However, their status as a 501(c)(3) non-profit does not
~

entitle them to immunity.
In Sikkenga, the Tenth Circuit made clear that an entity's status as a
501(c)(3) non-profit does not bestow state sovereign immunity on it, holding that a
501(c)(3) non-profit laboratory wholly owned by the University of Utah was not a
governmental entity entitled to sovereign immunity, and reasoning that the entity at
issue "earns the bulk of its revenue from its operations outside the University
community ... can enter into contracts with commercial entities, and maintains
bank accounts in its own name." Id. at 719-20; see also Woodford v. Glenville

State Coils. Housing Corp., 225 S.E.2d 671, 672 (W. Va. 1976) (holding that a
non-profit corporation was not an instrumentality of the state and did not enjoy
sovereign immunity from suit under the state constitution).
Additionally, despite specifically identifying numerous entities that are
tantamount to the state, the Act itself makes no mention of nonprofits or 50 I (c)(3)
corporations. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 63G-7-102(10) ("'State' means the state of
Utah, and includes each office, department, division, agency, authority,
commission, board, institution, hospital, college, university, Children's Justice
Center, or other instrumentality of the state.").
Moreover, accepting USURP and A WSF's argument that an entity's status
as a 501(c)(3) organization makes that organization a sovereign entity with the
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protection of sovereign immunity would lead to absurd results. If that proposition
were the law, then white supremacist entities organized as 501(c)(3) non-profits
would be able to claim sovereign immunity as arms of the state. 5 An entity's status
as a 501 (c)(3) organization simply is not relevant to the analysis of whether that
entity is a "public corporation" or "instrumentality of the state" entitled to
sovereign immunity.
In sum, the Court should expressly adopt and apply the non-exhaustive
factors employed by sister states and federal courts, as described more fully above,
in answering Question No. 1. Each of these factors weighs against a finding that
USURF or A WSF is a governmental entity protected by sovereign immunity under
the Act.

II.

SECTIONS 63G-7-501 AND -502 DO NOT REFLECT AN INTENT BY
THE STATE OF UTAH TO BAR SUITS AGAINST STATE
GOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES IN FEDERAL COURT
Even if this Court were to hold that USURF and AWSF are Utah state

governmental entities entitled to sovereign immunity under the Act (which it
should not), this Court should rule that the Immunity Act does not reflect an intent

5

For example, the New Century Foundation, a 501(c)(3) entity which hosted
an annual conference that included neo-Nazis and white supremacists, raises
money for the benefit of the "white race," and holds its tax-deductible donations
"in trust for the white race." See Michael Kunzelman, White Nationalists Raise
Millions with Tax-Exempt Charities, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec. 22, 2016,
https://www.apnews.com/ aelc8163ac574bb3bdlf3facfca5fb83.
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~

~

by the State of Utah to bar suits against the state in federal court. The Eleventh
\@

Amendment of the United States Constitution-not the Act-governs whether a
Utah governmental entity has sovereign immunity from suits in federal court.
State sovereign immunity under state law, such as that embodied in the Act,
is "the principal that the state cannot be sued in its own courts without its consent."

Madsen, 658 P.2d at 629 (emphasis added). The Federal Case is not a suit in the
Utah state courts against a Utah governmental entity and, thus, the Act's
codification of the principle that Utah cannot be sued in its own courts, except as
expressly waived in the Act, are inapplicable.
Because the Act is inapplicable to the Federal Case, the Immunity Act has
no effect on whether a Utah governmental entity has waived its immunity from suit
in federal court; that is the province of the Eleventh Amendment, which can be
waived by conduct, even in the face of a state statutory immunity act. See, e.g.,

Trant v. Oklahoma, 754 F.3d 1158, 1172 (10th Cir. 2014) (fmding waiver of
Oklahoma's right not to be sued in federal court by consenting to removal, despite
\(i}

existence of functional equivalent of Immunity Act); Ku v. Tennessee, 322 F.3d
431, 435 (6th Cir. 2003) (finding that State of Tennessee had waived its sovereign
immunity to suit in federal court by engaging in substantial discovery, filing a
motion for summary judgment, and only raising an immunity defense after the
federal court's adverse ruling on the summary judgment motion); Hanldns v.
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Finnel, 964 F.2d 853, 856-58 (8th Cir.1992) (state waived immunity by "seek[ing]
to take advantage of the suit for its own benefit").
The Trant case is instructive. In that case, the Tenth Circuit found that the
State of Oklahoma waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal
court by consenting to removal to federal court and thereby voluntarily invoking
the federal. court's jurisdiction. See id. The court's conclusion was in the face of
Oklahoma's equivalent of the Immunity Act, namely, the Governmental Tort
Claims Act ("GTCA"), which states, in relevant part:
[t]he state, only to the extent and in the manner provided in this act,
waives its [sovereign] immunity and that of its political subdivisions.
In so waiving immunity, it is not the intent of the state to waive any
rights under the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Venue for actions against the state within the scope of [the
GTCA] shall be either the county in which the cause of action arose or
Oklahoma County, except that a constitutional state agency, board or
commission may, upon resolution filed with the Secretary of State,
designate another situs for venue in lieu of Oklahoma County.
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, §§ 152.l(B), 163.
Like the GTCA, the Immunity Act expressly limits waivers of sovereign
immunity to those "expressly waived in [the Act]." UTAH CODE ANN.§ 63G-7301(3) ("A governmental entity and an employee of a governmental entity retain
immunity from suit unless that immunity has been expressly waived in this
chapter."). And, like the GTCA, the Immunity Act has jurisdiction and venue
provisions. See UTAH CODE ANN.§§ 63G-7-501, -502. Accordingly, like the
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defendant in Trant, USURF and AWSF are subject to suit in federal court, even if
they are entitled to sovereign immunity and subject to the Act, including the
jurisdictional and venue provisions of the Act.
In further response to the second certified question, the language of the
jurisdictional and venue provisions of the Immunity Act demonstrates that the
Act's protections do not apply to the claims GeoMetWatch has brought against
USURF and A WSF in the federal case. This is because GeoMetWatch's claims
are not brought under the Act. The Immunity Act expressly confines its
jurisdictional and venue provisions to claims brought under the Act. Section 63G7-505(1) states, "[t]he district courts have exclusive, original jurisdiction over any
action brought under this chapter." UTAH CODE ANN. § 63G-7-501(1) (emphasis
added). That chapter (i.e., Chapter 7) is the Immunity Act. And, Section 502 of
the Immunity Act likewise necessarily relates to claims brought in Utah state court.

See id. -502(1). Thus, under the plain language of the Immunity Act, its
jurisdictional and venue provisions do not extend beyond claims brought under the
Act. In other words, if a plaintiff brings a cause of action against a governmental
entity that does not rely on the waiver of immunity set forth in the Act (i.e.,
allowing itself to be sued in its own courts in certain circumstances), then the
jurisdictional and venue provisions in the Act do not apply.
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Here, GeoMetWatch has not brought claims against USURP or AWSF based
on the waivers of immunity expressed in the Immunity Act. Nowhere in its
pleadings or its papers has GeoMetWatch articulated a reliance upon the waivers
expressed in the Immunity Act. GeoMetWatch did not even mention the Act,
including because there was no argument or factor that suggested that USURP or
AWSF were akin to the sovereign. Accordingly, because the Immunity Act only
touches on issues of sovereign immunity in Utah state courts, and because
GeoMetWatch has not brought an action under the Immunity Act, the jurisdictional
and venue provisions enacted by the Utah Legislature do not apply to
GeoMetWatch's claims in the Federal Case.

III.

UTAH ENTITIES MAY WAIVE THE JURISDICTIONAL AND
VENUE PROVISIONS UNDER THE IMMUNITY ACT
Even if this Court determines that USURP and AWSF are governmental

entities subject to the Immunity Act (which it should not), USURP and AWSF can
waive application of the Act, including its jurisdictional and venue provisions. See
Hart, 945 P.2d at 133 (holding that sovereign immunity under the Act is an
affirmative defense that can be waived); see also Bentley v. Cleveland Cty. Bd. of
Cty. Comm 'rs, 41 F.3d 600, 605 (10th Cir. 1994) (reiterating that sovereign
immunity under the GTCA was an affirmative defense that the governmental entity
waived).
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However, it is not necessary for USURF or A WSF to waive the
jurisdictional and venue provisions of the Act to be sued by Geo MetWatch in
federal court. The jurisdictional and venue provisions of the Act are not
determinative of whether USURF and AWSF can be sued in federal court. As
discussed above, the question of a sovereign's waiver of its immunity from suit in
federal court is not governed by the Act, but rather the Eleventh Amendment and
federal case law articulating the basis for waiver of sovereign immunity from suit
in federal court under the Eleventh Amendment. See e.g., Trant, 154 F.3d at 1172
(finding waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity despite existence of functional
equivalent of Immunity Act); see also Ku, 322 F.3d at 435 (finding waiver of
Eleventh Amendment immunity).
The Eleventh Amendment grants a state immunity from suit in federal court,
~

but a state may waive that immunity expressly or impliedly. See, e.g., Lapides v.

Board ofRegents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 535 U.S. 613,618 (2002) ("A State remains
free to waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in a federal court.");

Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436,447 (1883) (stating that sovereign immunity is "a
personal privilege which [the government] may waive at pleasure."). For example,
federal courts have held that a state waives its immunity under the Eleventh
Amendment by submitting its rights for determination by the federal court or
through its litigation conduct in federal court. See, e.g., Lapides, 535 U.S. at 619-
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22 (holding that state waived immunity from suit in federal court on state-law
claims for money damages when it voluntarily removed case to federal court); see
also Ku, 322 F.3d at 435 (finding waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity by
state engaging in substantial discovery, filing a motion for summary judgment, and
only raising an immunity defense after an adverse ruling by the federal court on the
summary judgment motion).
The rationale for constructive waiver is to prevent inconsistent, anomalous,
or ''unfair results." Lapides, 535 U.S. at 619 ("And this makes sense because an
interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment that finds waiver in the litigation
context rests upon the Amendment's presumed recognition of the judicial need to
avoid inconsistency, anomaly, and unfairness, and not upon a State's actual
preference or desire, which might, after all, favor selective use of 'immunity' to
achieve litigation advantages."). "Thus, it is not surprising that more than a
century ago [the Supreme Court of the United States] indicated that a State's
voluntary appearance in federal court amounted to a waiver of its Eleventh
Amendment immunity." Id.; see also id. at 620 (ruling that a state's act of
consenting to removal constituted a "clear" waiver of immunity).
Here, presuming arguendo that USURF and A WSF are governmental
entities under the Act, they have waived any immunity they might have had to suits
in federal court by invoking the federal court's jurisdiction in filing their

41
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

counterclaims and a third-party complaint in the Federal Case. (RI 08-204). They
have further waived their immunity from federal suit by their litigation conduct in
the Federal Case, including by engaging in two years of extensive discovery~

taking and defending depositions, serving and responding to written discovery
requests, and filing and opposing discovery motions-all of which was directed
only at the substantive merit of GeoMetWatch's claims against USURF and
AWSF, not sovereign immunity, as reflected in Docket Entries 129, 177, 186,242,
243, 244, 263, 321, 403, 427, and others. (R30-59). The acts ofUSURF and
A WSF in the Federal Case are far more involved than merely consenting to
removal, which is an act that, standing alone, results in a "clear" waiver of
immunity. Lapides, 535 U.S. at 620.
Because ofUSURF's and AWSF's conduct, the United States District Court

'ti

for the District of Utah has jurisdiction to adjudicate the claims GeoMetWatch has
asserted against USURF and A WSF in the Federal Case, and the Immunity Act is
not a bar to that adjudication.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons articulated herein, the Court should rule that neither USURF
nor A WSF are governmental entities entitled to sovereign immunity under the
Immunity Act.
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The Court should also rule that Utah Code sections 63G-7-501 and -502 do
not reflect an intent by the State of Utah to limit waiver of sovereign immunity to
suits brought in Utah state courts, and that the Act is not determinative of whether
USURF and AWSF waived their sovereign immunity from claims against it in the
Federal Case.
Finally, the Court should rule that USURF and AWSF can waive the
jurisdictional and venue provisions of the Immunity Act, even though such waiver
is not necessary to allow GeoMetWatch's claims to proceed in the Federal Case.
DATED this 30th day of August, 2017.
OS
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